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Abstract 
In this paper, I argue that all the existing theories of the firm, i.e., the transaction 
cost, knowledge-based, and entrepreneurial theories, are insightful yet partial 
since they only deal with one or another possible situation in which the first ever 
firm came to exist. In addition, all of them have a common problem of 
buyer/entrepreneur/firm-centrism because they all ignore the role of employees in 
the formation of the firm. I argue, since they are complementary to each other, a 
new, comprehensive and integrative theory of the firm must be able to unify them 
with a consideration of employees. I propose a relationship-based theory of the 
firm (R’BT) as such a candidate theory.  The R’BT places the employer-employee 
(or broader, firm-stakeholder) relationships at the centre of its whole theoretical 
framework and argues that the notion of relationship harmony is fundamental in 
explaining the nature of the firm.  
 
Keywords: theory of the firm, relationship, harmony, transaction cost, 
entrepreneurship, knowledge 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Entering into the new century, the world has witnessed a string of global crises, ranging 
from the ‘moral crisis’ caused by scandals such as Enron in 2001 and Madoff in 2008, to 
the environmental crisis such as pollution and climate change, and to the global financial 
crisis. What can be seen in them are the direct and indirect linkages between those macro-
level crises and the micro-level firm behaviors. The simultaneous failure of the business 
communities to achieve economic, environmental and social sustainability urges us to 
rethink the ineffectiveness of our management knowledge and to reexamine the basic 
tenets of our field (Freeman and Zollo, 2009). In this paper, I focus on one foundational 
issue: the theory of the firm. 
 
In economics, the theory of the firm is the most rapidly expanding subfield (Foss, 1996a: 
470).  In a narrow sense, i.e., in accordance with Coase (1937), a theory of the firm 
should address three issues regarding the nature of the firm: the existence, the boundaries, 
and the internal organization of the firm. According to Conner and Prahalad (1996: 479), 
the value of developing a theory of the firm for management and organizational 
researchers is to identify a necessary building-block for addressing the broader issue of 
performance difference between firms. Thus, Foss (1999) suggests that a strategic theory 
of the firm should address one extra issue: the competitive advantage of the firm. 
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Broadly speaking, there are three schools of thought within the existing literature on the 
theory of the firm: transaction cost economics (TCE), knowledge-based theory (KBT), 
and entrepreneurial theory. The TCE is based on Coase’s (1937) transaction cost theory 
and currently dominated by Williamson’s (1975, 1985) opportunism-based theory of 
asset specificity. The KBT is pioneered by Kogut and Zander (1992), Conner (1991), 
Conner and Prahalad (1996)1
 
, Grant (1996) and Pitelis and Teece (2009). The 
entrepreneurial theory is proposed by Casson (1998, 2005), Foss and Klein (2005) and 
Langlois (2005). Each of the three schools offers different answers to the three Coasian 
themes. 
Foss (1999) points out that in this research field, there are two approaches toward theory 
advancement. Some people prefer developing the theory of the firm along each line of 
thinking while some others see an integrative theory combining different schools 
necessary and desirable. And in fact the entrepreneurial theory is such a kind of 
integrative effort to synthesize the theory of the firm and the theory of entrepreneurship 
long existed separately in economics. In this paper, I want to go a step further to integrate 
all the three schools of thought by proposing a relationship-based theory of the firm 
(R’BT). 
 
2. Literature review 
 
The TCE argues that, according to Coase, the firm exists because it can reduce 
transaction costs incurred when using price mechanism (i.e., market). However, when 
one market-based transaction is incorporated into the firm, it will cause an increase of 
coordination cost within the firm while it reduces transaction cost. So, the firm will tend 
to expand until the increase of coordination cost is equal to or larger than the decrease of 
transaction cost. With the assumption that human nature is opportunistic and boundedly 
rational, Williamson operationalized Coase’s verbal theory by developing his theory of 
asset specificity, according to which, the firm exists to avoid opportunism-related 
transaction costs; for a transaction involving specific assets, the more specific the assets 
to the transaction, the higher the potential for post-contract opportunism therefore higher 
transaction costs; and in such a situation, the natural solution to avoid such opportunism 
is to incorporate the assets into the firm. Different from Alchain and Demsetz (1972), 
both Coase and Williamson hold that within the firm the management has an 
organizational authority over the employees to direct them by fiat what to do and how to 
work; and Williamson further argues that the firm acts as an internal court for resolving 
disputes within the firm. 
 
The KBT offers a different perspective which sidesteps the issue of opportunism. Kogut 
and Zander (1992) argue that the firm exists because it can provide a social community 
for sharing, creating and transfer of knowledge more effectively than through market. 
The boundary of the firm (or, the make-or-buy decision) is then dependent on three 
                                                          
1 Although Conner (1991) initially aims to argue for resource-based theory as a new theory of the firm in 
comparison to the transaction cost theory, Conner and Prahalad (1996) argue that ‘a knowledge-based view 
is the essence of the resource-based perspective’.  
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factors: the current knowledge, learning capacity and combinative capabilities of the firm. 
With regard to the internal organization question, the KBT emphasizes on ‘organizing 
principles’ which frame how individual and functional expertise is structured, 
coordinated, and communicated (Zander and Kogut, 1995).  So, if the TCE is about 
‘avoiding negatives’, i.e., opportunism and transaction cost, the KBT is about ‘creating 
positives’ (Conner, 1991: 140), i.e., gains from specialization in knowledge acquisition 
and storage (Grant, 1996:113). 
 
What are their responses to each other? The knowledge-based theorists accept the validity 
of the TCE and argue that the KBT is a complement to the opportunism-based 
perspective (Conner and Prahalad, 1996), nevertheless, Conner and Prahalad (1996) 
argue that the knowledge-based considerations can not only explain the existence of the 
firm but also outweigh opportunism-related ones (i.e., TCE) as Conner (1991) tries to 
make a case that firms exist for reasons primarily related to “creating positives” rather 
than “avoid negatives” and argues that ‘unlike transaction cost theory, resource-based 
theory as theory of the firm does not depend on the presence of opportunistic potential’ 
(Conner, 1991: 144).  
 
In contrast, the TCE defenders such as Foss (1996a, 1996b) dismiss the knowledge-based 
perspective being able to independently explain the key question of firm existence. Foss 
(1996a) made a ‘very powerful’ critique of KBT (Barney, 1996) by arguing that ‘it is 
erroneous to think that higher order organizing principles are a qualitative differential of 
the firm relative to the market, although they are probably in reality a quantitative one. 
That is, the qualitative presence of higher order organizing principles does not necessarily 
distinguish the market relative to the firm; rather, there may be “more of it” in the firm 
than in the market, as Arrow (1974) forcefully argued. The argument that firms better 
cultivate higher order organizing principles demands, however, precisely an argument 
from opportunism’.  
 
However, in the literature, the TCE is very controversial and a target of heavy criticisms. 
For instance, Masten, Meehan and Snyder (1991) make it crystal clear that Coase’s 
original transaction cost argument is easy to make and impossible to refute, which 
implies the Coase’s transaction cost theory is not scientific as Popper (1934, 1959) has 
argued that scientific theories must be falsifiable.  Barney (2001) echoes this charge and 
label it as ‘Coasian tautology’. Coase (1988) himself and Demsetz (1988: 147) argue that 
Williamson’s hypothetical linkage between asset specificity and transaction cost is weak, 
as Masten et al.’s (1991: 4) further point out that ‘a finding that higher asset specificity 
leads to a larger probability of integration could, in principle, obtain even if the 
hypothesis that asset specificity raises contracting costs were invalid’. But the most 
serious attacks come from Pfeffer (1994) and Ghoshal and Moran (1996). They argue 
Williamson’s version of transaction cost theory is ‘bad for practice’ because of the false 
or at least imprecise assumption about human nature, i.e., being opportunistic. According 
to psychology theories, people’s attitudes and behaviours are likely to be modified in 
response to their perceptions how they are treated by other people surrounding them. 
Negative perception derived from mistrust due to the opportunism assumption may 
reinforce people’s opportunistic attitude and behaviors through a positive feedback loop. 
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Therefore, the opportunism becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. Due to the self-fulfilling 
propensity of the opportunism-based theory, it is very dangerous in management practice 
to design organizational control and incentive mechanisms according to this theory. The 
irony of the opportunism-based TCE theory is likely to cause more opportunistic 
behavior they theory is designed to reduce.   
 
Even so, Foss (1996b: 519) still holds firmly the ‘conventional’ view that ‘we cannot do 
without concepts such as opportunism if we wish to explain the existence of the firm’ 
(Foss, 1996a: 474). In the meantime, despite Williamson’s (1999: 1093) critique of the 
KBT relying on ‘ex post rationality’, Foss (1996: 470) commends KBT that ‘properly 
interpreted, knowledge-based theories may help shed light on issues relating to the 
boundaries and internal organization of the firm’. For example, Grant (1996) is a good 
piece. What is interesting is that both Foss (1996a, 1996b, 1999) and Conner (1991: 143) 
see TCE and KBT complementary and share the view that an integration of the two 
perspectives may be fruitful for further theory development. One such integration effort 
results in the entrepreneurial theory of the firm.  
 
The entrepreneurial theory tries to synthesize the theory of entrepreneurship and the 
theory of the firm. They follow Knight (1921) to view entrepreneurship as judgment, 
which they argue provides a natural answer to the question of the existence of the firm, 
namely, because judgment cannot be purchased on the market, the entrepreneur needs a 
firm - a set of alienable assets he controls - to carry out his function (Foss and Klein, 
2005). The changes of firm boundary (i.e., via mergers, acquisitions, divestitures, and 
other reorganizations) ‘are best viewed as responses to a valuation discrepancy’ (Foss and 
Klein, 2005: 17) as the entrepreneurs expect efficiency improvement ‘by replacing poorly 
performing managers, creating operating synergies, or establishing internal capital 
markets’ (Foss et al., 2007: 1176). Regarding internal organization, they discuss how 
entrepreneurs process and synthesize information to identify new opportunities for 
coordination (Casson, 1998) or how entrepreneurs delegate judgmental decision-making 
rights to subordinates and how to manage the ‘derived’ judgment and entrepreneurship 
(Foss, Foss and Klein, 2007). 
 
They see entrepreneurship as ‘a crucial but neglected element’ (Langlois, 2005) in 
explaining the nature of the firm because ‘the establishment of a new business venture is 
the quintessential manifestation of entrepreneurship’ (Foss et al., 2007: 1167), viz. ‘the 
firm exists because of entrepreneurship’ (Langlois, 2005). Therefore, entrepreneurship is 
‘a necessary element in any comprehensive synthesis’ of otherwise ‘partial theories’ of 
the firm (Casson, 2005: 327-9). Casson (2005: 345) argues that since both the TCE and 
KBT ‘are compatible with the theory of entrepreneurship and can, therefore, be 
synthesized within this framework’, thus, the addition of entrepreneurship ‘is not minor 
refinement of the theory of the firm, but represents a radical change’ (Cass, 2005: 327). 
 
In my view, all of the three perspectives are insightful yet partial. Both opportunism and 
entrepreneurship are necessary and complementary for explaining the existence of the 
firm because obviously we cannot exclude the two possibilities for which the first ever 
firm came to exist, i.e., the first ever firm may emerge out of an entrepreneur’s desire to 
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establish a firm or out of a buyer’s solution to avoid opportunism the seller might act. I 
agree with Foss (1996a) that KBT does not offer an ultimate answer to the existence 
question because in both situations in which the first ever firm may come to exist, 
knowledge consideration is not the fundamental factor. However, I argue the KBT may 
shed light on the entrepreneurship perspective, i.e., one possible rationale behind 
entrepreneurship is that the entrepreneur might believe in the potential synergy by 
effective utilizing others’ knowledge. So, it is clear there is a linkage between the three 
perspectives. 
 
Nevertheless, I have a common criticism of the three perspectives, namely, their answers 
to the firm existence question clearly show their buyer/entrepreneur/firm-centrism, or, in 
Zajac and Olsen’s (1993) term, ‘a single-party’ emphasis that ‘neglects the 
interdependence between exchange partners’. For instance, the transaction cost theory is 
buyer-centric because it says the buyer decided to form a firm to avoid the costs of 
transacting with the sellers. It ignores the role of the sellers: why should the sellers 
obediently accept to become the buyer’s employees just because the buyer wanted to 
avoid some costs? The entrepreneurial theory is entrepreneur-centric because it says the 
entrepreneur decided to form a firm in order to have some people to make derived 
judgments for him. But, why should those people working freely on market obediently 
accept to become the entrepreneur’s employees to take on the responsibilities of 
judgmental decision making? Similarly, why should those people give up their freedom 
to become someone’s employees just because someone else wanted to take advantage of 
their own knowledge?2
 
 All of them (TCE, KBT, entrepreneurial theory) are silent on 
such a question or might have never considered it an issue. 
What all the existing theories miss is a theoretical consideration of the employees, i.e., 
those who accept to work for other people, which is an indispensible party of any 
economic transactual relationship. Obviously, those people who work with freedom on 
market will not obediently accept to become other people’s employees without benefiting 
from such a change of status. Some scholars including Coase’s (1988) and Ghoshal and 
Moran’s (1996) have called for an alternative theory. I argue, a new, comprehensive and 
integrative theory of the firm must explicitly address this ‘why becoming employee’ 
question. In this paper, I propose a relationship-based theory as such a candidate theory. 
As a hint, the concept of relationship indicates a consideration of both parties of a 
relationship. In the following sections, I will use the concept of relationship and the 
notion of relationship harmony describing the quality of a relationship to frame my whole 
argument, which I intend to integrate all the existing theories of the firm as well as some 
elements of the stakeholder theory, the latter being not primarily a theory of the firm in 
the strict sense, i.e., it does not primarily aim at addressing the key question of firm 
                                                          
2 Pitelis and Teece (2009: 10) clearly understand the problem of ignoring the role of employees as they 
critique the ‘efficiency gains from transaction costs…may not be an adequate explanation for employees 
voluntary accepting to work for employers’. However, their account is still entrepreneur-centric as they 
argue ‘firm exist because of the intentions of their principals-to-be’ (p. 11), i.e., ‘for their principals-to-be 
to capture value (profit from) their appropriable value creating advantage’ (p. 10). They clearly refer firm 
principals-to-be as the entrepreneurs (p. 10) or owner-shareholders (p. 8). 
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existence, yet offering insights for boundaries, internal organization and competitive 
advantage issues of the firm.  
 
3. Foundations of the R’BT 
 
3.1 Assumptions about Human nature 
 
The relationship-based theory of the firm (R’BT) assumes human nature is multifaceted 
and consists of two parts: a negative part and a positive one. The negative part is further 
divided into self-interest and opportunism. The positive part also has two subparts: 
cooperation and altruism, which some economists seem to recognize, e.g., Fehr and 
Gächter (2000). Therefore, Williamson’s assumption about human nature is very biased 
and ‘bad for practice’ because he solely focuses on the worst part of human nature – 
opportunism.  
 
R’BT also assumes that human nature is not static but environment-sensitive. According 
to dissonance theory (Aronson, 1980; Festinger, 1957), there is a positive feedback 
relationship between human behavior and the modification of human attitude as a means 
of reducing dissonance (Ghoshal and Moran, 1996: 21). Since human behavior is often 
constrained by surrounding environment, human attitude is therefore modified by the 
external signal from the surrounding environment. These signals may include: how others 
surrounding you behave, how they treat you, and how they talk about human nature, etc.  
 
To relax a bit our assumption about human nature being environment-sensitive, even if 
we cannot be sure if the two parts (and their subparts) can/will change in relative size, we 
are still confident in arguing that human attitudes derived from the respective parts of 
human nature can/will change. In social psychology, there is a crowding theory which 
argues human’s intrinsic motivation may be crowded out by extrinsic motivation, such as 
monetary incentive, and under some circumstances, it is difficult to restore the crowded-
out intrinsic motivation even the extrinsic motivation is removed (Deci and Ryan, 1985; 
Lane, 1991; Lepper and Greene, 1978). This crowding-out effect is acknowledged by 
other organization scholars like Osterloh and Frey (2000) and some economists such as 
Frey (1994) and Frey and Oberholzer-Gee (1997).  
 
There is also a crowding-in effect which allows external intervention, a reward or 
regulation, to strengthen or ‘crowd in’ intrinsic motivation (Frey, 1994: 335). Fehr and 
Gächter (2000: 159) point out that ‘many people deviate from purely self-interested 
behavior in a reciprocal manner’, namely, ‘in response to friendly actions, people are 
frequently much nicer and much more cooperative than predicted by the self-interest 
model’. Because of the propensity of reciprocal behavior, many social psychologists led 
by Martin Seligman, the then president of the American Psychological Association, have 
called for a positive psychology movement which is ‘concerned with what is right with 
people and building on that instead of trying to just fix what is wrong with people’ 
(Luthans and Youssef, 2004:151).  Positive psychology has spurred two related 
movements that emphasize the positivity and strength of human being. The first is the 
positive organizational scholarship (POS), and the second the positive organizational 
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behavior (POB) (e.g., Luthans, 2002a, 2002b). I argue organization and management 
studies in general urgently need a positive theory of the firm and management in order to 
escape from the ‘pathological spiraling relationship’ (cf. Enzle and Anderson, 1993; cited 
in Ghoshal and Moran, 1996: 25) or the ‘self-fulfilling prophecy’ of opportunism 
argument (Ghoshal and Moran, 1996: 21). The proposed R’BT is intended to be such a 
positive theory of the firm by purposefully emphasizing the positive side of human nature 
while downplaying the negative side.  
 
3.2 The concept of relationship 
 
According to Merriam-Webster online dictionary, relationship is defined as ‘the relation 
connecting or binding participants in a relationship’, which indicates ‘the state of being 
related or interrelated’. In this sense, I make clear from the outset that, the concept of 
relationship I use in the R’BT is very different from the one used in resource-based view 
(RBV) because the R’BT sees relationship as the dynamic relation between two parties 
rather than what the RBV talks about relationship as a particular type of resource the firm 
owns. This is why I term my relationship-based theory as R’BT, to distinguish from the 
RBV. 
 
Apparently, there are two types of economic relationships, market-based and firm-based. 
Market-based relationships include arm-length exchange relationships and longer-term 
cooperative relationships between strategic alliance partners. Firm-based relationships 
can be divided into task-oriented and people-oriented relationships, the former concerns 
how people are related in their joint accomplishment of tasks while the latter concerns 
how people are related socially and psychologically.  
 
Here, I summarize four different views of commercial relationship: contractual, capital, 
game, and option views. 
 
The contractual view sees relationship as a kind of contract because ccommercial 
relationships are based on contracts, explicit or implicit. Kay (1993) identifies three types 
of commercial contract: spot, classical and relational contracts. Many scholars from 
different disciplines have discussed the concept of relational contract, such as law scholar 
Macneil (1974, 1978, 1980), economists like Olson (1965) and Grossman and Hart (1983, 
1986) and sociologists like Bradach and Eccles (1989), Fox (1974), Granovetter (1985), 
McAuley (1963), Thompson et al., (1991) and Zucker (1986). In the R’BT, any 
relationship is underpinned simultaneously by two or three types of contract in Kay’s 
typology. Take the example of a firm’s relationships with its customers. When a 
customer buys a firm’s products from the market, the buying-selling is a spot contract. 
Meanwhile, regulations of consumer rights protection serve as the legal contract between 
the firm and its customers, although this is often not discussed during the buying-selling 
process. Moreover, there might be a potential relational contract between the firm and its 
customers in that, if the firm takes care of its customers, they may become loyal to the 
firm. Another example is the relationships between a firm and its employees. The 
employer-employee relationship involves the legal employment contract as well as a 
psychological contract. If the firm looks after its employees more than the employment 
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contracts require, the employees will be more satisfied psychologically, hence they would 
be willing to put more effort in their jobs as reciprocity, the commitment, productivity 
and creativity of the work force may thus be increased.  
 
The capital view pays attention to the potential capital embedded in relationships. The 
modern concept of capital encompasses four types: economic capital, human capital such 
as knowledge and skills, social capital such as networks and trust, and positive 
psychological capital such as confidence, hope and optimism (Luthans and Youssef, 
2004). While economic capital and human capital can be generated independently by 
individuals, social capital can only be captured from embedded resources in a social 
network (Lin, 2001) of relationships. Lazega and Pattison (2001) propose that social 
capital, as resources embedded in social network, includes information, colleagues’ 
goodwill, advice and sometime emotional support, as well as many other means that 
serve individual and collective ends. Therefore, the social capital can enhance mutual 
trust and cooperation and therefore strengthen the interdependence between two parties, 
leading to the increase in commitment, productivity and creativity of individuals. The 
concept of relationship in R’BT includes social capital as well as the positive 
psychological capital because the development of a person’s confidence, hope, optimism 
and resiliency (i.e., positive psychological capital) is unlikely if he or she works in a very 
discouraging and conflicting environment. So a harmonious relationship is a precondition 
for developing the positive psychological capital. 
 
Economists and management theorists frequently use game theory to analyze economic 
or business relationships (Casson, 2000; Kay, 1993; McMillan, 1992; North, 1990). 
IBM’s founder Thomas J. Watson Sr. once spelled out that ‘business is a game, the 
greatest game in the world if you know how to play it’ (cited in McMillan, 1992). Kay 
(1993) uses game theory to explain the cooperation and coordination of business 
relationships. Many scholars point out that mutual trust is the cornerstone of long-term 
relationship (Fuller and Lewis, 2002; Jarillo, 1988; Johannisson, 1987; Kay, 1996; 
Lorenzoni and Ornati, 1988). From a game theoretical perspective, building relationship 
is actually a repeated game in which trust, reciprocity, and mutual gains are necessary for 
an ongoing cooperation. The Japanese corporate system has had a harmonious capital-
labour relationship owing to the cultural emphasis on trust (Matsumoto, 1991). A stable 
long-term relationship is hardly possible if the benefit of engaging in a relationship is 
only partial rather than mutual. In a sense, people or organizations establish or join in 
relationships for the sake of gaining benefits from the relationships. Chen (2004) explains 
why a guanxi network is vital to Chinese people and points out that the favour exchange 
is the norm of building a guanxi or a ‘guanxi web’. Su and Littlefield (2001) analyze the 
favour-seeking and rent-seeking dimensions of guanxi and claim reciprocity is the core of 
a guanxi. Larson (1992) also suggests that reciprocity norm is one of important factors 
underpinning the duration and stability of relationship. 
 
The option concept was borrowed by strategy scholars to explain strategic management 
as ‘a process of organizational resource-investment choices, or option’ (Bowman and 
Hurry, 1993: 760) (e.g., Bowman and Hurry, 1987; Hurry, 1993; Hurry et al., 1992; 
Kester, 1984; Kogut, 1991; Myers, 1984; Sharp, 1991). In financial market, the 
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development and use of option contracts were motivated by risk-averse people’s intuition 
of ‘keeping options open’ against the uncertainty of future (Bowman and Hurry, 1993: 
761). It can be said that strategies emerge from investment in resources which generate 
options for future investments. In the R’BT, relationships can also be understood from 
the option perspective. When two parties establish a relationship, each side does not 
know how the other side will behave in the future. Due to risk-aversion consideration, 
both parties want to strengthen the relationship through investing in the relationship, 
resulting in a gradual accumulation of each party’s sunk cost of engagement. This 
incremental investment in the established relationship serves as an effective mechanism 
to reduce the opportunism. Another advantage of building relationship is to retain the 
option for future opportunity deriving from the current relationship. This is evidenced in 
the Chinese practice of building ‘guanxi web’ – a network of personal relationships based 
on reciprocity (Luo, 1997). By investing in different relationships, they essentially keep 
their future options open.  While the western approach of relationship building is 
intended as an option to avoid risk and contain opportunism, the Chinese guanxi network 
is used as an option for access to future opportunities. This demonstrates the complexity 
and casual ambiguity (Einhorn and Hogarth, 1986) of relationship options compared to 
contractual options (i.e., option contracts). In this sense, we can say that the relationship 
engagement is more sophisticated than other strategic options (Bowman and Hurry, 1987). 
 
 3.3 The concept of harmony 
 
When it comes to describing the state of a relationship, two opposite words naturally 
spring to our minds: conflict and harmony (Cheng, 2006). Conflict is normally associated 
with competition while harmony with cooperation. Scholars have often called for 
cooperation (Child et al., 2005; Doz and Hamel, 1998), especially, in the firm-
stakeholder relationships (Gulati and Kletter, 2005; Jones, 1995; Jones and Wicks, 1999; 
Rindova and Fombrun, 1999; Ring and Van de Ven, 1992). Relationship harmony is 
viewed as crucial in the Confucian societies. Obviously, harmonious relationships can 
effectively reduce (albeit not to eliminate) some contracting costs associated with agency, 
shirking, underinvestment and opportunism due to the enhanced trust and cooperation 
(Jones, 1995). Therefore, harmony rather than conflict in relationships is desirable and an 
enduring goal to pursue for the majority of human beings. 
 
But, what is harmony? Although there might be various definitions of the concept, I don’t 
want to dig into the philosophic meaning of harmony, instead, in this paper, I offer a 
practical perspective on harmony in economic relationship. To avoid the difficulty of 
defining a public concept, I choose to describe the state of harmonious relationship, i.e., 
the quality of relationship (Ghoshal and Moran, 1996: 37), by dimensionalizing the 
concept with different aspects. Jones (1995) and Jones and Wicks (1999) point out trust 
and cooperation are fundamentally important in managing stakeholder relationships. In 
addition, how both parties of the relationship perceive whether their respective goals fit 
each other, viz. whether they have shared interests, is also very important for the ongoing 
relationship (Ghoshal and Moran, 1996: 36). Accordingly, I dimensionize relationship 
harmony with three variables: shared interests, mutual trust, and obligation fulfillment. 
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This means, if the two parties of a relationship have shared interests, mutual trust and can 
fulfill their own obligations, their relationship is harmonious. Obviously, there is a degree 
issue, namely, the more shared interests, the more mutual trust and the better they fulfill 
their obligations, the more harmonious their relationship is. I argue, only when all three 
variables reach a certain degree, the minimalist harmony state will come into being. This 
is to say, if any one variable scores too low, it will result in disharmony even if the other 
two variables score relatively high. For instance, if there is a conflict of interests, i.e., 
lack of shared interests, then there can hardly be mutual trust and obligation fulfillment. 
If one party does not well trust the other, i.e., low mutual trust, no matter how well the 
other party fulfils its obligation, their relationship can hardly be harmonious. Similarly, if 
one party often does not fulfill its obligation, no matter how good their relationship 
initially may be, the other party will gradually lose trust in it, i.e., mutual trust damaged. 
To put it another way, if any of the three variables scores lower than a minimal level, the 
relationship is not harmonious, viz. there is relationship disharmony. 
 
I also distinguish two types of harmony: one being a realistic harmony in which no body 
is unhappy about the relationship, the other an idealistic harmony in which everybody is 
happy about the relationship. To maintain a stable relationship, a realistic harmony is 
necessary. To build a health relationship, an idealistic harmony should be ceaselessly 
pursued. 
 
4. The nature of the firm 
 
4.1 Existence of the firm 
 
Market-based relationships are normally not harmonious, due to the lack of shared 
interests (i.e., conflict of interests) and mutual trust between the buyers and the sellers, 
and opportunistic potential on the part of the sellers. Due to such relationship disharmony 
embedded generally in market-based relationships, neither side of a market-based 
relationship can gain maximized self-interest out of their relationship. The R’BT argues 
the firm came to exist to remedy the problem of relationship disharmony and to provide a 
vehicle for both parties to gain more self-interests than what available on market.  
 
The transaction cost theory implicitly assumes that there had existed market transactions 
before one party of the transaction decided to employ the other parties to form a firm. In 
so doing, the TCE naturally precludes the role of entrepreneurship in explaining the 
emergence of the firm. The R’BT accepts this assumption (i.e., market transaction 
preceding the establishment of the firm) as just one possible situation in which the first 
firm came to exist. The other possible situation the R’BT acknowledges is that the first 
firm came to emerge out of the first ever entrepreneur’s personal desire. Therefore, the 
R’BT is to offer a new solution encompassing both opportunism and entrepreneurship 
perspectives. But, what is new here in comparison to the TCE and entrepreneurial theory 
is that the R’BT does not believe that it is either the high transaction costs or the needs of 
delegating judgmental decision rights that characterizes the situation out of which the 
first firm was born. As we can imagine, at the time when the first ever firm came to 
emerge, the business should be not too complex as in modern time, and what the 
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entrepreneur needed might be simply finding some laborers in local neighborhood to do 
some not so complex tasks under the entrepreneur’s intention and direction. Therefore, 
the costs of searching for labor providers should be fairly low and there might not need to 
be any formal contracts therefore costs of contracting could be ignored. The monitoring 
cost should also be a trivial issue too. Similarly, it is highly unlikely that the first ever 
entrepreneur wanted and needed other people to make judgmental decisions for him/her.  
 
Then, what is the relationship-based theory of firm existence. Let us start from the first 
situation where prior market transactions existed. Imagine a person A who needed some 
one to do some things for him. He came to the market and found person B. A told B 
about his purpose and asked if B was willing to do so. While A was willing to pay $0.8, 
B asked for $1.2 for that task. After negotiation, they agreed the deal at $1. Then B did it 
and got $1 from A. At the end of this deal, A wanted to continue this transaction and B 
accepted. In the extended deal, A was not willing to pay more for the same service while 
B was of course not going to do more service for A for the same amount of pay. So, their 
market-based transactions continued as usual for a while until one day B started to shirk. 
The possible reason for such shirking behavior might be either due to B’s opportunistic 
nature or B’s perception that his labor was underpaid. Why such perception? It is because 
B might believe his service well deserved $1.2 as he initially asked for but rejected by A, 
or at least was worth of more than $1 otherwise why A wanted to continue this deal. Due 
to B’s shirk, the service he provided in this task then was less than before, which was 
then detected by A. A was unhappy with the outcome and rejected to pay the same fee as 
before, and then A cut the payment to $0.9. In the following process of transactions, the 
similar behaviors happened again, and a vicious circle occurred. So, the service B 
provided to A became less and less while the fee A paid to B reduced accordingly until 
one day the transaction was discontinued due to a certain degree of disharmony 
accumulated in their relationship.  
 
In the above story, we see two stages of the market-based transaction between buyer A 
and seller B. The first stage is the $1 deal where no opportunism is involved. The second 
stage is the period where the vicious circle of $1$0.9$0.8 took place due to the 
opportunism on the part of the seller. In each stage, the buyer A might feel dissatisfied 
with the deal because what he could gain from the market-based transaction was no more 
than $1. In the meantime, neither can the seller get more than $1 payment. Imagine, if A 
was at the same time in deals with more than one seller, say B and C. In this situation, 
what A could get out of the market-based transactions with B and C was no more than $2 
while he paid out no more than $2 as well. In the first no opportunism involved stage, the 
buyer A might suddenly have had an idea that if employed by him the sellers B and C 
might be able to generate more than $2, say $3 valued service, due to buyer A’s effective 
management and coordination between B and C. Then there will be $1 extra generated by 
such employment relationships. Buyer A thought if he was to offer $1.2 each to sellers B 
and C for the same tasks, then B and C would be willing to become A’s employees with 
an agreement to accept A’s authority what to do and how to do. Then, in the end, buyer A 
could still gain extra $0.6 (= $1 - $0.2 x 2) while sellers B and C each gain $0.2 extra. 
With such an idea, buyer A approached sellers B and C with such idea. Since all of them 
could benefit from the new employment relationships, they all accepted. So, the first ever 
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firm emerged because it solved the problem of relationship disharmony inherent in 
market-based relationships and provide a mechanism for all the parties involved to gain 
more self-interest benefit than whatever available on market.  
 
If the firm emerged in the first stage of the market-based transaction, i.e., $1 deal without 
opportunism involved, then buyer A’s entrepreneurship is the sole determinant of the 
emergence of the firm. In contrast, if the firm emerged in the second stage, i.e., 
$1$0.9$0.8 vicious circle, then it is either or both of opportunism avoidance and 
entrepreneurship of buyer A that made the firm emergence possible. In the case of 
entrepreneurship, the KBT can shed light on the mechanism of synergy generation, i.e., 
$1+$1=$3>$2, because working together and under direction, the personal knowledge 
resided in different people can be better shared and combined to improve economic 
efficiency, as first argued by Adam Smith (1776) with the idea of specialization and 
coordination. This is how the R’BT integrates the opportunism, entrepreneurship and 
knowledge perspectives as well as taking into consideration of the role of employees.  
 
4.2 Boundaries of the firm 
 
Since the R’BT argues that the firm is a better governance mode to increase self-interest 
gains of all parties of transactual relationships, then why not organize all transactions in a 
big firm? This question can be divided into two interrelated sub-questions: first, why not 
just one big firm without any markets? second, why there are other firms competing with 
each other? For the first, we can follow Coase’s (1937) logic, managing many 
transactions within the firm will incur coordination costs, if the increase of coordination 
cost outweigh the increase of self-interest gain on the entrepreneur side, then the 
entrepreneur will stop to incorporate extra transaction into the firm. For the second sub-
question, the answer is that when many transactions (and the people involved) are 
incorporated into the firm, the employees may find the relationships in the firm not 
harmonious or less harmonious than before or in other firms, they may choose to leave, 
either going back to market or going to other firms. Why?  
 
R’BT argues the firm tends to expand as long as it can attract more people and maintain a 
certain degree of harmony in their relationships as well as provide better chances for 
newcomers’ personal goal realization. But the firm won’t expand infinitely because 
existing relationships may be disharmonized with the gradual expansion of the firm for 
different reasons. For example, many long-time employees may feel they are less cared 
about by the central management if they used to enjoy much more close relationships 
with the management. Another reason might be more people means less benefit can be 
shared if the profit growth is slower than the payroll expansion. So, the firm size expands 
until the number of insiders quitting the firm due to perceived decreasing harmony by 
expansion is equal to or greater than the number of newly recruited with a perception that 
this firm may offer them a better chance for realizing their personal goals than anywhere 
else or working alone.  
 
Above logic can also be applied to groups of peoples (i.e., subunit within the firm). If the 
top management fails to maintain harmonious relationships with its subunits, the subunits 
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may quit via management buy-out (MBO) or with other solutions. On the other hand, if 
the central management perceives there is no synergy or even disharmony between a 
subunit and the rest of the firm, the firm may divest it. Understandably, the divesture of 
subunits can be done for those units purchased from market, which implies the firm 
might have misjudged the potential for enhancing harmony in the relationships by 
shifting the inter-firm relationships into intra-firm relationships, or even if the initial 
judgment was not a mistake by bringing them into the firm, the switched relationships 
turned out to be less harmonious than prior arm-length relationships. 
 
With regard to vertical integration, it is still the relationship between the firm and its 
business partner (another firm) that dictates the acceptable governance structure. Say, the 
firm has so far had a harmonious relationship with one supplier. If there is no any 
disharmonious contingency emerging in their relationship, they will carry out their 
businesses as usual. Imagine, one day, if the supplier suddenly requests the firm to pay an 
extra fee for the same transaction carried out before. Whether this request will bring 
disharmony or not into their relationship will then depend on how the firm perceives this 
request. There are several possibilities: firstly, if the firm perceives it as fair because the 
supplier might have had an increased cost for providing the same product or service due 
to the increased costs of raw materials and labors, then in order to maintain a harmonious 
relationship, the firm will fully accept this extra fee request; secondly, if the firm 
perceives the request is not fair because the extra fee requested is higher than the 
increased cost to the supplier, then there are two options for the firm to choose, for one, if 
the extra fee is acceptable, the firm may tolerate and accept this request for the sake of 
maintaining the relationship though a bit disharmony will be built into their relationship; 
for another, if the extra fee is not acceptable, then the decision of the firm depends on 
how important this buyer-supplier relationship to the firm: if it is not important and if it is 
possible to find another supplier for the same product and service, the firm will choose 
switch to another supplier; if the relationship is very important or there is no other 
suppliers for the same product and service, the firm may choose to purchase this supplier. 
 
4.3 Internal organization 
 
R’BT offers another viewpoint on authority in the firm. Rather than lean towards either 
Coasian fiat-type authority of the employer over employees or Alchian and Demsetz’s 
(1972) no authority at all argument , the R’BT argues the owners or their representatives 
(i.e., managers) do have authority over the employees or subordinates because by joining 
the firm the employees voluntarily accept some kind of organization authority. But the 
authority has its limit. According to Simon (1951, 1995), the employer’s authority over 
its employees is restricted by the employees’ ‘zone of acceptance’ under the assumption 
of utility maximization rather than the neoclassical assumption of profit maximization 
(Simon, 1995: 279) where ‘profit [consideration] is only one among a number of [other 
considerations] and enters into most subsystems [of the firm] only in indirect ways’ 
(Simon, 1964: 21). And the real authority lies in the capacity for the employer, under the 
precondition of maintaining a harmonious relationship, to prioritize its organizational 
goals over its employees’ individual goals. 
 
A relationship-based theory of the firm: a Chinese perspective – by Xin Li (xl.int@cbs.dk)                                                   4 May 2010 
Department of International Economics and Management, CBS, Working Paper wp1-2010-xl 
 
14 
This prioritization-under-harmonization capacity based authority indicates that if the 
employer abuses its bargaining power, if its fiat falls outside the employees’ ‘zones of 
acceptance’, the employees may choose to leave the firm, and then there will be no 
authority over them anymore. But, if the employer firstly builds and harmonize its 
relationships with its employees, then the employer can more easily prioritize its 
organizational goals over employees’ personal goals, and the employees tend to accept 
such authority of prioritization.  
 
R’BT also does not prefer the formal control argued for by TCE scholars, especially 
Williamson (1975, 1985). In China where relationships and harmony are highly 
appreciated and cultivated the management philosophy goes it is not impossible to 
achieve a perfect type of control: governing without intervening. Governance without 
interference can be understood like this: don’t interfere your subordinates, if you selected 
them, trust them, empower them, and encourage their creativity, and then they might get 
tasks done effectively, efficiently and creatively. If leaders at each level follow this 
‘governing without interference’ principle to manage their subordinates who in turn 
manage their own tasks, then the whole company can be governed without interference. 
 
But this is not to deny the necessity and value of formal mechanism to exert a certain 
degree of control on the employees. As mentioned before, there are two types of 
relationship in the firm: task-oriented and people-oriented. The R’BT argues, to 
harmonize the task-oriented relationships, the firm needs to establish certain formal 
regulations such as award-and-penalty rules and to implement certain management tools 
such as enterprise resource planning (ERP) system. For the people-oriented relationships, 
it is better to rely on more informal means to harmonize them, for example, to facilitate 
socialization among the employees, to take care of employees and fellow colleagues, to 
enhance mutual trust, and to nurture a friendly and flexible corporate culture, etc. 
 
4.4 Competitive advantage 
 
Economics is concerned with efficiency (i.e., best, optimal) use of limited resources 
(Marschak and Radner, 1972: 3). However, many economists have paid more attention 
on economic resources such as physical and financial resources than on human resources. 
R’BT argues human resources of an individual such as time, effort, knowledge and 
creativity are scarce resources to himself. Where to work, what to work with, and how to 
work are very important decisions which will determine the efficiency of the use of his 
human resources. Obviously, working in a disharmonious environment will hamper the 
allocation efficiency of human resources. So in order to improve the allocative efficiency, 
the human resources must find a harmonious work place. This explains why we say the 
firm has an advantage over the market in helping the individuals to gain more self-
interests out of their commercial relationships. 
 
An economic organization in general strives to make economic rent, i.e., above average 
profit. There are four major types of economic rent: first, Porterian rent derived from 
strong bargaining power in contractual relationships. According to Porter’s (1980) model 
of five forces of industry, we understand that a firm can squeeze or appropriate the value-
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added of its suppliers and customers, and its employees as well. Obvious, this rent is 
generated at some other’s expenses; second, Ricardian rent derived from superior 
resources the firm controls, which is argued for by the resource-based view; third, 
Schumpeterian rent derived from entrepreneurial innovations or creative destructions 
(Schumpeter, 1934) which generate more value than existing economic system; the last 
one, I term as Confucian rent. Under harmonious relationship people work in a more 
committed, more productive or/and more creative way than otherwise if there is no 
harmony in the relationship. The extra output above normal generated by working more 
committedly, productively and creatively is the Confucian rent.  
 
But above analysis does not explain the competitive advantage of one firm compared to 
another firm. The R’BT explains the competitive advantage of a particular firm by 
arguing that the more harmony in the firm, the more potential to have a competitive 
advantage over others for two reasons. First, harmonious relationships within the firm 
allow the firm to better utilize the current human resources available to the firm. Second, 
more harmonious relationships within the firm compared with others help the firm to 
attract talented people from other places (market or other firms) to join the firm due to its 
good reputations and those people’s expectations of better utilizing their own human 
resources. The R’BT asserts the fundamental and ultimate competitive advantage of the 
firm rests in its ability to effectively attract, retain and utilize the talented people. 
Relationship harmony is then a determining factor underpinning that ability. 
 
R’BT argues harmonious relationships provide the firm a relationship advantage, i.e., the 
relative high potential for the employees’ reciprocal efforts to help the firm to realize its 
organizational goals, which can be argued as the foundational level advantage of the firm, 
while the low cost and differentiation advantage are the end level competitive advantage. 
Any other competitive advantages in between these two levels are categorized as 
intermediate level advantages, such as innovative, entrepreneurial and quality advantages. 
As efficiency of allocation is not equal to efficiency of utilization, so the R’BT further 
argues there must be a transformational mechanism for the firm to encourage the 
commitment, productivity and creativity of the employees and by doing so the firm can 
then transform the foundational relationship advantage through intermediate level 
advantages into the ultimately end level advantage, i.e., low cost, or differentiation, or 
combination of the two. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
In this paper, I argue that all the existing theories of the firm, i.e., the TCE, KBT, and 
entrepreneurial theory, are insightful yet partial since they only deal with one or another 
possible situation in which the first ever firm came to exist. In addition, all of them have 
a common problem of buyer/entrepreneur/firm-centrism because they all ignore the role 
of employees in the formation of the firm (cf. Zajac and Olsen, 1993). I argue, since they 
are complementary to each other a new comprehensive and integrative theory of the firm 
must be able to unify them with a consideration of the employees. The relationship-based 
theory of the firm is such a candidate theory because the concept of relationship naturally 
links the entrepreneurs with the employees and it is compatible with transaction and 
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knowledge (i.e., capital) perspectives. The R’BT also affirms the significance of 
entrepreneurship in explaining the existence of the firm because without entrepreneurship 
there would be no such a thing called the firm. 
 
Since the R’BT places the firm-stakeholder relationships at the centre of its whole 
theoretical framework and prescribes the value of relationship harmony, this new theory 
of the firm may have important implications for management. If we follow the logic of 
the R’BT, then the essence of management is a total relationship management (TRM) and 
what we need and should strive for is a never-ending harmonization of the firm-
stakeholder relationships. Therefore, this paper also makes a contribution in a way to the 
stakeholder argument.  
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